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In their recent article on embodied cog-
nition, Wilson and Golonka (2013) also
discuss research on conceptual metaphors
like “power is up” or “the future is for-
ward” to exemplify common approaches
to embodied cognition. Metaphors are
particularly interesting for embodied cog-
nition research because they can map
concrete, bodily experiences onto abstract
concepts (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). To
be sure, one could take issue with the
selection of the two specific studies (Miles
et al., 2010; Eerland et al., 2011). Only
the latter study (Miles et al., 2010), which
examined the relation between mental
time travel and bodily posture, involves
a conceptual metaphor, whereas the for-
mer study (Eerland et al., 2011) invokes
the notion of a mental number line rather
than any conceptual metaphor and indeed
demonstrates that sometimes cognitions
and bodily postures go together. There
are many other interesting demonstrations
that are consistent with the notion that
conceptual metaphors inform and shape
thinking (for a review, see Landau et al.,
2010).
More importantly, we believe that to
appreciate the joint operation of bod-
ily experience and metaphors one needs
to take into account metaphors that are
actually articulated and encountered in
linguistic practice. Conceptual metaphors
represent general mappings that are
assumed to organize and facilitate thought
and judgments. Often, they are inferred
and formulated by researchers, but many
of them are not, or only exceptionally,
used in non-scientific, everyday speech,
and discourse. However, to understand
how physically rooted language helps peo-
ple perform tasks such as judgments or
decisions in the real world, one needs to
study metaphoric devices that are com-
monly used in language communities, that
is, idiomatic or conventional metaphors
like “alcohol is a crutch” or “revenge is
sweet” (Holland, 1982; Burbules et al.,
1989). The source concept of an idiomatic
metaphor often represents a concrete bod-
ily or physical state, whereas the target
concept is relatively abstract. Idiomatic
metaphors are relevant to embodied cog-
nition precisely because they involve the
concurrent activation of a bodily sensation
and an abstract cognitive concept, which
jointly guide people’s cognition.
Research on embodied cognition has
focused on only one type ofmetaphor, that
is, conceptual metaphors. But idiomatic
metaphors differ in several key aspects
from conceptual metaphors, and these
differences have important implications
for theorizing on embodied cognition
(Hellmann et al., in press). In the fol-
lowing, we will briefly explain the differ-
ences between conceptual and idiomatic
metaphors and then point to implications
of idiomatic metaphors for embodied cog-
nition research and theorizing.
Conceptual metaphors combine two
entities that intuitively fit together like
weight and importance (Jostmann et al.,
2009; Schneider et al., 2011). However,
they are typically not used in speech
and everyday language as frequently
as idiomatic metaphors. Conceptual
metaphors primarily represent inferences
that guide individuals’ cognitions. This
effect emerges because one concept often
spontaneously activates another, intu-
itively similar, concept. However, the
source concept is not necessarily a con-
crete physical experience, and the target
concept does not necessarily represent
a rather abstract domain (see Schneider
et al., 2011).
For an idiomatic metaphor to guide
individuals’ cognitions toward relevant
judgments, there are more cognitive lim-
itations than for a conceptual metaphor:
The associations between the two con-
cepts of the metaphor are less strong,
less intuitive, and less stable in idiomatic
metaphors. There is a more limited appli-
cability of idiomatic metaphors than of
conceptual metaphors. While concep-
tual metaphors often work both ways,
that is, they are bi-directional, idiomatic
metaphors operate one-way, that is,
uni-directionally. Additionally, when an
idiomatic metaphor is reversed it loses its
original and genuine sense (Glucksberg
et al., 1997; Landau et al., 2010).
Because the associations are less sta-
ble and less intuitive in an idiomatic
metaphor, it requires the concurrent acti-
vation of both of its concepts (see
Hellmann et al., in press). Source and
target concept have to be specifically
activated to in a given situation to pro-
vide a new understanding of the target
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concept and shape individuals’ thinking
and judgments. Evidence this for this con-
straint is provided by our own recent
research (Hellmann et al., in press). In
two experiments, we investigated whether
the sensation of sweet taste informs
judgments of harmful acts via indirect
activation of the idiomatic metaphor
“Revenge is sweet.” We found in one
study that only after priming with the
concept revenge, but not after prim-
ing with the similar concept schaden-
freude, a concurrent sweet (vs. fresh) taste
led to more lenient judgments. Hence,
a physical state per se is not sufficient
for effects of idiomatic metaphors on
cognition.
The differences between the two types
of metaphor have important implications
for the understanding of embodied cog-
nition. Conceptual metaphors can affect
cognition already when only one of the
pertinent concepts (source or target con-
cept) is activated because the other con-
cept will be automatically co-activated (see
Barsalou, 2003). As our research suggests,
idiomatic bodily metaphors can affect cog-
nition only when both source concept and
target concept are sufficiently activated
such that the source concept can actually
be mapped onto the target concept in a
given situation.
To conclude, if one wants to under-
stand the role of linguistic devices like
metaphors in embodied cognition, one
should take into account and appreciate
the role of idiomatic metaphors. Following
the terminology suggested by Wilson and
Golonka (2013), such linguistic devices
often serve as resources for the per-
formance of real-world tasks (also see
IJzerman and Koole, 2011). Importantly,
to the extent that idiomatic metaphors are
distinctive means for integrating bodily
experiences into thinking, they certainly
deserve attention by researchers interested
in embodied cognition.
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